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NOTES
A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING?: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF JUSTICE HARLAN'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS FORMULATION
Anthony C. Cicia*
INTRODUCrION
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' the Court upheld both a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy and the legitimacy of substantive due
process jurisprudence in constitutional law.2 Casey was a critical case
because of its timing; the Court decided the case at an important junc-
ture in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. During the
1960s and 1970s the Court had generally extended the scope of protec-
tion secured by the Due Process Clause.3 During the 1980s, however,
the Court stopped extending the scope of due process protection in
favor of a more restrictive approach.4 Many observers thought the
Court would take advantage of the opportunity presented by Casey
and actually shrink the scope of the basic liberties secured by the Con-
* I would like to thank Professor James E. Fleming for inspiring my passion for
constitutional law, the cogent insights with which he has always supplied me, and the
guidance and support he has always given me. I would also like to thank Professor
Terry Smith for similar guidance and support over the past two years.
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth amend-
ment provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Courts have interpreted
the Due Process Clause as having two components: procedural due process and sub-
stantive due process. Procedural due process ensures that people will receive ade-
quate legal procedure in any adjudication. Substantive due process, however,
protects some rights that are so essential that the government may not abridge them
regardless of the procedures used. See Walter F. Murphy et al, American Constitu-
tional Interpretation 1061-62 (2d ed. 1995). Substantive due process, thus, gives
meaning to the word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause, and has become an impor-
tant source in the Constitution for protecting rights. See infra part IV.
3. See, e-g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(extending the right to live with one's family to families that were not traditional
nuclear families); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the right of a woman
to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(recognizing the right to marriage without state interference).
4. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (refusing to extend the
right to raise one's child to illegitimate parents); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (refusing to recognize a homosexual's right to intimate association).
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stitution.5 The Casey decision thus shocked those commentators who
had expected the Court to overrule Roe.6
In affirming the vitality of substantive due process, the joint opin-
ion7 relied on Justice Harlan's formulation of substantive due process
in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman.8 In this dissent, Justice Harlan stated
that:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is
.... a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a free-
dom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless re-
straints and which also recognizes.., that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment.9
Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation enjoys wide ac-
ceptance; it has received praise from both liberal and conservative
fundamental rights theorists. 10
5. Many factors led people to believe that the Court would act this way. The
Court had become increasingly conservative during the 1980s. George Bush's elec-
tion in 1988 signalled another four years (at least) of potential conservative appoint-
ments. Bush fulfilled this prophecy by appointing Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas by 1991. With Justice Blackmun's age (80 in 1990), the possibility existed that
Bush would be in office to fill his spot with a conservative. This would leave Justice
Stevens as the only liberal on the Court. Also, the Reagan and Bush administrations
had asked the Court six times to overrule Roe, and this appealed to some of the
conservative Justices. See Murphy et al., supra note 2, at 1281. Thus, all signs pointed
to a radically conservative Court that would overrule cases that had extended the
scope of basic liberties secured by the Constitution. Justice Blackmun even predicted
such behavior by the Court. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
537-38 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Many commentators also expected the
Court to shrink the scope of basic liberties. See infra note 6.
6. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Center Holdsl, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Aug. 13,
1992, at 29; Linda Greenhouse, Slim Margin: Moderates on Court Defy Predictions,
N.Y. Times, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 1; Richard J. Neuhaus, The Dred Scott of Our Time,
Wall St. J., July 2, 1992, at A8; Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Victory for Roe, N.Y. Times,
June 30, 1992, at A23.
7. In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued the Court's holding
in the form of a joint opinion. In a joint opinion, no single Justice authors the opin-
ion; instead, several Justices combine their views into one opinion. See David B. An-
ders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L.
Rev. 895, 895 n.6 (1993). Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote separate concurring
opinions giving a majority to the joint opinion's holding that a woman has a right to
choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
8. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 543. This passage is by no means a complete outline of Justice Harlan's
substantive due process formulation. For a detailed discussion of Justice Harlan's for-
mulation, see infra part I.
10. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 60
(1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Autonomy] (citing Charles Fried, Order and Law 72
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One jurist who has explicitly not accepted Justice Harlan's substan-
tive due process formulation is Justice Scalia. In Casey, Justice Scalia
bitterly dissented and blasted the joint opinion for relying on Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation." Justice Scalia's sub-
stantive due process formulation would thus appear to be very differ-
ent from Justice Harlan's formulation adopted by the joint opinion.
This, however, is not the case. In fact, upon close examination, the
two formulations are strikingly similar. 2 This point is especially im-
portant because the joint opinion's reliance on Justice Harlan's formu-
lation in Casey may make Justice Harlan's formulation the most
important method of securing basic liberties in the coming decades.13
This Note argues that proponents of an expansive substantive due
process formulation should repudiate the joint opinion's reliance on
Justice Harlan's formulation because, in reality, it duplicates Justice
Scalia's narrow, restrictive view of substantive due process. Part I out-
lines Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation as embod-
ied in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman." Part II examines Justice Scalia's
substantive due process formulation by extrapolating his beliefs from
the four major substantive due process cases that have been before
the Court during his tenure. Part I compares the two formulations
and concludes that they are strikingly similar. Part IV argues that this
similarity requires commentators and Justices who are committed to a
Constitution that affords stringent protection to substantive due pro-
cess rights to reject Justice Harlan's substantive due process formula-
tion. This Note concludes that commentators and judges who favor an
expansive scope of due process protection should recognize the hid-
den dangers of wholesale adoption of Justice Harlan's substantive due
process formulation.
I. JUSTICE HARLAN'S "COMMON LAW" SuBsTANTivE DUE
PROCESS FORMULATION
Justice John Marshall Harlan was appointed to the Court in 1955.15
During his tenure, Justice Harlan took part in some of the most influ-
ential Supreme Court cases in modem history, including Brown v.
(1991), and Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 76-79(1991)).
11. Casey, 505 U.S. at 983-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (likening "reasoned Judgment" to "value judgment[s]," "political
choice[s]," and "personal predilection[si"). The joint opinion calls Justice Harlan's
substantive due process formulation "reasoned judgment." I at 849.
12. See infra part I.
13. See infra part IV.
14. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15. Bruce Ackerman, The Common Laiv Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 5, 26 (1991).
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Board of Education (Brown II),16 Baker v. Carr,17 Griswold v. Con-
necticut,1 8 and Miranda v. Arizona. 9 Although Justice Harlan is gen-
erally considered to have been a conservative Justice,2 0 not every
aspect of his jurisprudence is regarded as conservative.2 1 In particu-
lar, Justice Harlan's substantive due process jurisprudence is com-
monly categorized as liberal.' In fact, Justice Harlan is known as "the
author of the constitutional right to privacy. '
An analysis of Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation
requires a preliminary appreciation of his position as a common law
judge. His dissent in Poe v. Ullman' represents the only opinion in
which Justice Harlan fully articulated his beliefs on substantive due
process, and thus is the key to the development of his substantive due
process beliefs.25 This section first briefly outlines the role of a com-
mon law judge and then demonstrates how Justice Harlan's approach
to substantive due process exemplified this common law tradition.
A. Common Law Jurisprudence
In a recent article, Professor Bruce Ackerman outlined the role of a
common law judge and contrasted it with the role of a judge he calls
16. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (implementing educational desegregation in the United
States).
17. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (recognizing the fundamental right to vote and the one
person/one vote principle).
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the fundamental right to privacy).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protecting arrestees from self-incrimination by requiring
the government to make them aware of their constitutional rights).
20. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 15 (criticizing Justice Harlan for being con-
servative); Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
33 (1991) (praising Justice Harlan for being conservative).
21. See Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan-A Comment on Fried
and Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1991); Nadine Strossen, Justice Harlan
and the Bill of Rights: A Model For How a Classic Conservative Court Would Enforce
the Bill of Rights, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 133, 133-34 (1991).
22. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 21, at 133-34 (characterizing Justice Harlan's
substantive due process as liberal); Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 Tenn. L.
Rev. 441, 442-44 (1992) (same).
23. See Fried, supra note 20, at 35.
24. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. Although Justice Harlan wrote a concurrence in Griswold, that concurrence is
not a second source of his beliefs about substantive due process. All Justice Harlan
said about his substantive due process formulation in Griswold, is that he based his
decision on the same "reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Although Griswold was not specifically decided on due process grounds, it has
come to be regarded as a due process case. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 128 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (defending his substantive due process views by stating
that he believes Griswold was rightly decided); Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at
57 (referring to Griswold as a substantive due process case).
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an "independent constitutionalist."' Three characteristics define
common law judges and distinguish them from independent constitu-
tionalists: reference point, view of the Constitution, and model deci-
sion maker. The first characteristic concerns the appropriate
reference point to which a judge should look to determine if, and how,
a right merits protection.' A common law judge's time frame begins
at the amorphous birth of the common law (Ackerman calls this "time
immemorial") and emphasizes slow, evolutionary development of
historical practices to protect rights.39 Thus, a common law judge
does not protect novel rights that involve departures from tradition.
An independent constitutionalist, on the other hand, looks back only
to the important "historical exercises in popular sovereignty" of the
United States and emphasizes turning points (i.e., the Founding and
Reconstruction) in protecting rights.3
The second distinguishing characteristic of common law jurists con-
cerns their view of the Constitution. An independent constitutionalist
believes that the Founders and their successors were "gamblers" who
developed our nation based on unprecedented, untested abstrac-
tions.31 Thus, independent constitutionalists view the Constitution as
a charter of abstract ideals, and thus advocate for interpreting the
Constitution in a broad, abstract manner.32 Common law judges,
however, are deeply suspicious of such novel social experiments. To
common law judges, "these abstract projects are meaningless without
the exercise of practical wisdom by practical [judges]. 33 Also, com-
mon law judges do not believe a judicial decision should rely on con-
temporary notions of fairness; instead, a decision should rest on past
"judicial opinions written by hard-headed common law lawyers."''
Thus, common law judges view the Constitution as an accumulated
mass of precedent that has slowly shaped the nation's history.
The last distinguishing characteristic is the view of whom a judge
looks to as the model decision maker. A common law judge does not
rely on the views of "some group of politicians" in deciding a case.35
A common law judge instead looks to and relies upon the wisdom of
26. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 8-10. Ackerman's article is by no means a
complete outline of the common law tradition, but it will suffice for purposes of this
Note.
27. See id. at 8-9.
28. Id. at 9; see also id. at 6 (stating that the common law "began in the forests of
Northern Europe where Germanic tribes first tasted a liberty-loving alternative to
Roman despotism").
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id at 8-9.
31. Id. at 9.
32. This view is similar to that of a fundamental rights theorist. See infra note 47.
33. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 9.
34. Id
35. Id. at 10.
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judges who came before her.36 The judge, not the legislature, func-
tions as the "true hero of our constitutional order."37 For an in-
dependent constitutionalist, the ideal decision makers, the people
upon whom a judge relies in decision making, are those who helped
shape the abstract social experiment that is the United States.38 An
independent constitutionalist masters these decision makers' basic
principles and uses them as a guide in deciding cases.
When Justice Harlan was appointed to the Court, he was intent on
adhering to the common law tradition that had been disregarded dur-
ing the New Deal.39 "[F]aced with the disintegration of the [common
law tradition], John Harlan sought to revitalize common law constitu-
tionalism."40 Nowhere was this commitment more evident than in
Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation.
B. Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation
Justice Harlan's pronouncement of his due process beliefs came in
his dissent in Poe v. Ullman.41 The issue in Poe was whether Connecti-
cut statutes that criminalized using contraceptives or giving medical
advice about contraceptives violated the Due Process Clause.42 The
majority dismissed the case on justiciability grounds, holding that the
plaintiffs had made an insufficient showing that the statute would be
enforced against them.43 In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the
case presented a justiciable issue and that the statutes violated the
Due Process Clause.44 This dissent evidences all the aspects of Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation: reliance on tradition,
evolution of tradition, judicial restraint, and a narrow definition of the
rights at issue.
1. Reliance on Tradition to Decide Whether a Right Deserves
Protection Under the Due Process Clause
Justice Harlan believed that due process is "built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual," and constitutes the balance
the United States has struck between that liberty "and the demands of
36. Id.
37. 1&
38. See id. at 9-10.
39. See id. at 6-7. During the New Deal, the Court began to uphold legislation
that disrupted the distribution of wealth established and protected by the common
law system. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 51 (1993).
40. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 7.
41. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 498; see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (West 1958). In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), the Court held that these statutes were
unconstitutional.
43. Poe, 367 U.S. at 508.
44. ld. at 522-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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organized society."45 To Justice Harlan, due process represented "a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."46
This language evokes a fundamental rights theorist's view of a for-
ward-looking, aspirational due process concerned with realizing the
ideals of liberty and equality.4 7
Throughout the opinion, however, Justice Harlan tempered his lan-
guage with emphasis on the common law tradition. Justice Harlan se-
verely limited the scope of his substantive due process formulation by
grounding it in tradition. Justice Harlan believed that the liberty due
process secures, despite being a "rational continuum" that protects
against "all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless re-
straints," cannot break from the nation's longstanding traditions.48
The traditions Justice Harlan emphasized were not abstract, aspira-
tional traditions, but rather historical realities.4 9 For example, Justice
Harlan believed that "Each new claim to Constitutional protection
must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes,
as they have been rationally perceived and historically developed."5 0
This demonstrates that, although Harlan believed in looking to "con-
stitutional purposes," which sounds aspirational, he relied on how
45. Id at 542.
46. Id. at 543.
47. See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should
Be Overruled, 59 U. ChLi. L. Rev. 381,382 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated
Rights]; Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 16-22; James E. Fleming, Constructing
the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 264 (1993) [hereinafter Fleming,
Constructing].
Fundamental rights theorists believe that the Constitution is an abstract scheme of
principles. See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion,
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 118-19 (1994) [hereinafter Dworkin, Dominion].
They feel that individuals possess certain fundamental rights that are so essential to
"the concept of ordered liberty" that the government cannot infringe upon these
rights without a compelling justification. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937); Dworkin, Dominion, supra, at 119; Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 19-
20 (stating that possession of fundamental rights is necessary for free and "equal citi-
zenship"). They believe that because of the abstract nature of the Constitution, to
derive fundamental rights from only the text of the Constitution is impossible. In-
stead, the clauses of the Constitution must be read in this abstract spirit of the docu-
ment. See Dworkin, Dominion, supra, at 166.
48. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Two contrasting uses of the term tradition exist. First, a judge can use tradi-
tion embodied in the aspirational principles that a nation strives to achieve. See Flem-
ing, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 56-57. A judge can also refer to tradition as
embodied in the way a nation has traditionally acted, historical practices. Id. Thus,
tradition can either be how a nation strives to act or how our nation has acted. See
also Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberak Romance; Community, and Tradition in Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 Va. L Rev. 1261, 1312-20 (1991)
(drawing the distinction between tradition as historical practice and tradition as ab-
stract beliefs).
50. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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these purposes have "historically developed."'" Thus, Justice Harlan's
substantive due process formulation is confined to protecting only
those rights that have enjoyed traditional protection in the United
States.
For example, Justice Harlan began his dissent in Poe by rejecting
two interpretations of the Due Process Clause: (1) that due process
protects purely procedural rights, and (2) that due process only pro-
tects the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments.5 2 Justice
Harlan rejected these views because they "[had] not been accepted by
th[e] Court as delineating its scope. '53 With this statement, Justice
Harlan emphasized the grounding of his substantive due process for-
mulation in tradition embodied in historical practices. Justice Harlan
thus rejected these interpretations because history had rejected them,
not for any aspirational reasons.
2. Substantive Due Process Concepts Can Evolve
In Justice Harlan's view of tradition, however, a judge is not com-
pletely bound to follow past historical practices. Justice Harlan indi-
cated that the correct due process inquiry had "regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the tradi-
tions from which it broke."'54 Thus, to Justice Harlan, "tradition is a
living thing," and any decision "which radically departs from [tradi-
tion] could not long survive." 55 Justice Harlan's tradition contains an
evolutionary element that would allow a judge to be critical of a his-
torical practice and break away from that practice. Justice Harlan's
due process jurisprudence, however, is not in the same category as a
fundamental rights theorist's forward-looking version of due process.
Justice Harlan relies too heavily on historical tradition for his substan-
tive due process formulation to qualify as aspirational or forward
looking.56
Also, although Justice Harlan indicated that tradition is a living
thing, he clearly meant "living" in an evolutionary, common law way.
He stated that a "decision... which radically departs from [tradition]
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has sur-
vived is likely to be sound. '57 Justice Harlan further described the
limited evolutionary nature of his living tradition by stating that a
51. Id. at 544 (stating that "the decision of an apparently novel claim must depend
on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria").
52. ld. at 540-41.
53. Id. at 540.
54. Id at 542.
55. Id.
56. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 47, at 265 (describing how fundamental
rights theorists conceive due process).
57. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2248 [Vol. 64
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"new decision must take 'its place in relation to what went before and
further [cut] a channel for what is to come.' ,,8
3. Judicial Restraint is a Necessary Component of Any Legitimate
Substantive Due Process Formulation
Justice Harlan further demonstrated the common law basis of his
due process formulation by stressing the need for judicial restraint in
applying due process. Justice Harlan cautioned that "[i]f the supply-
ing of content to [due process] has of necessity been a rational pro-
cess, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them."" Instead, judges
should "exercise limited and sharply restrained judgment" in applying
Justice Harlan's due process formulation.6' This concept of restraint
complements Justice Harlan's view of the slow evolution of a living
tradition because, for tradition to evolve slowly, judges must exercise
restraint in their judgments.
4. Narrow Definition of the Right in Question
A further characteristic of Justice Harlan's due process formulation
is the level of generality at which Justice Harlan identified the right in
question. In Poe, for example, instead of identifying the right in broad
terms such as "decisional autonomy,"'" Justice Harlan narrowly de-
fined the right as protection of the marital relationship. Justice
Harlan objected to the Connecticut law banning the use of contracep-
tives because the state was "intruding upon the most intimate details
of the marital relation with the full power of the criminal law."'  Jus-
tice Harlan believed that "the intimacy of husband and wife is neces-
sarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage,"
and thus must enjoy protection from state interference.3
Justice Harlan's method of selecting the level of generality is classic
common law jurisprudence. Justice Harlan first analyzed precedent
and concluded that a traditional level of protection guarded "the pri-
vate realm of family life." 64 Next, Justice Harlan narrowed the right
in question by reasoning that "[o]f this whole 'private realm of family
life' it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate
58. Id. at 544 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
59. Id. at 542.
60. Id. at 544.
61. Subsequent cases have relied on Poe to protect such broadly framed rights.
See; e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion) (for-
mulating the right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy as decisional
autonomy).
62. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 553.
64. I& at 551-52.
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than a husband and wife's marital relations."65 This narrow framing
of the right in Poe again demonstrates Justice Harlan's fidelity to the
common law tradition; a narrow definition of an asserted right would
lead to incremental evolution of the law. Any broader level of gener-
ality would result in more sweeping departures from tradition and
thus be unsound.
C. Summary of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due
Process Formulation
Justice Harlan was a common law jurist who applied his common
law method to the area of substantive due process. As his dissent in
Poe illustrates, the key components of Justice Harlan's substantive
due process formulation are: (1) the requirement that a right be a
part of a nation's tradition to receive due process protection; (2) the
recognition that tradition can evolve; (3) the need for judicial restraint
in deciding a substantive due process case; and (4) identifying the
right in question at a narrow level of generality.
Commentators believe that Justice Harlan's common law substan-
tive due process formulation is moderate, or even liberal, and thus
differs from the radically conservative substantive due process of Jus-
tice Scalia.66 A closer inspection of Justice Scalia's substantive due
process formulation will reveal, however, that this distinction is
illusory.
II. JUSTICE SCALIA'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FORMULATION
Justice Scalia is an originalist; in fact, Justice Scalia is arguably the
foremost originalist theorist in American jurisprudence. Thus, a gen-
eral understanding of the constitutional theory of originalism is neces-
sary to understand Justice Scalia's substantive due process
formulation. This part will briefly describe the originalist theory of
constitutional interpretation before turning to a description of Justice
Scalia's substantive due process formulation.
A. Originalism67
Originalists believe that the Constitution only protects those rights
specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution or those rights
65. Id. at 552. Harlan further limited the right by stating that, although govern-
ment cannot infringe upon the privacy of marriage, it is appropriate for the govern-
ment to forbid homosexuality, adultery, or any extramarital sex. Id. at 553.
66. See Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 58-59 (stating that the joint opinion
in Casey rejected Justice Scalia's highly restrictive substantive due process formula-
tion in favor of Justice Harlan's widely accepted formulation); West, supra note 22, at
444-45 (stating that Justice Harlan had a "liberal understanding" of substantive due
process, but Justice Scalia intends to shrink the scope of substantive due process).
67. What follows is by no means a complete or thorough outline of the originalist
school of Constitutional interpretation. The following outline is sufficient, however,
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that the Framers intended to protect.' Originalists further believe
that courts exceed their legitimate authority when they create rights
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.69
Although all originalists profess these basic tenets, specific theorists
"vary in the relative emphasis that they place on text [and] extrinsic
evidence of intentions."70 For example, Robert Bork believes that
judges should strive to discover the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion as the Ratifiers understood it.71 By contrast, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist believes judges must use the text or the Framers' intentions in
interpreting the Constitution.72 Justice Scalia's approach to original-
ism is called "faint-hearted" originalism.73 Justice Scalia believes that
sometimes originalist interpretation is "too bitter a pill" for a court to
swallow.74 At such times, he is willing to abandon originalism to reach
a more palatable result.75
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia's approach shares certain characteristics
of a more uncompromising originalism. First, originalists, including
Justice Scalia, provide for only a limited role for judicial review of
legislative decisions.76 Originalists believe that the proper decision
to understand the theoretical underpinnings of Justice Scalia's substantive due process
formulation.
68. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law 143-61 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L Rev.
849 (1989). The originalist approach thus represents the opposite view of fundamen-
tal rights theorists. See supra note 47.
69. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("The Court... comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language ... of the Constitution.") Although the author
of the Bowers majority opinion, Justice White, is not considered an originalist, his
reasoning in Bowers mirrors that of an originalist.
Originalists are not opposed to fundamental rights in general. They believe, how-
ever, that the only fundamental rights are those specifically enumerated within the
four corners of the constitution. See Murphy et aL, supra note 2, at 389. For example,
although originalism prohibits judges from creating unenumerated rights, it also pro-
hibits judges from eradicating rights that have already been granted by the Constitu-
tion and the democratic process. See Bork, supra note 68, at 147; Anders, supra note
7, at 898.
70. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 619, 627 (1994).
71. See Bork, supra note 68, at 144-45.
72. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L Rev.
693, 694 (1976).
73. Scalia, supra note 68, at 862.
74. Id. at 861.
75. Id. (stating that "in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist"). Scalia's
example of his "faint-hearted" originalism involves the Eighth Amendment. Scalia
states that historically public flogging was not considered cruel and unusual punish-
ment, but a modem-day decision that upheld a law providing for public flogging as
punishment would be outrageous. Thus, Scalia says faint-hearted originalists could
hold public flogging unconstitutional, but still adhere to originalism as a doctrine. Id.
at 861-62; see Young, supra note 70, at 628; Anders, supra note 7, at 899.
76. See Rehnquist, supra note 72, at 700; Young, supra note 70, at 629-30; Anders,
supra note 7, at 898.
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makers are popularly elected representatives, and that judges should
thus be deferential to the legislative will.7 7 Whenever a court declares
a legislative act unconstitutional, it runs the risk of acting politically,
rather than legally; this politicization is anathema to originalists. 8
Originalists believe that the greatest harm occurs when judges dis-
place the law in favor of their own moral "predilections. ' 79 According
to originalists, moral views can only become law through the political
process or by constitutional amendment.80
Originalists believe that for judges to fulfill their limited role, they
must make decisions according to "neutral principles."8' Specifically,
originalists feel that judicial decisions are illegitimate unless judges are
"controlled by principles exterior to the will of the [judge]. 82 This
neutral approach prevents judges from substituting their moral beliefs
for the text of the Constitution and ensures that they will rely on the
original understanding of the Constitution's text in making their
decisions.83
Originalists do recognize, however, that some constitutional clauses
are framed broadly and that it is difficult to determine the content of
those clauses by relying on the text.84 In such cases, originalists at-
tempt to interpret the intentions of those who were alive at the time
the open-ended clauses were put into effect.85 They do this by looking
77. This is what Professor Alexander Bickel has termed "the counter-majoritarian
difficulty." Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics 16 (1962). Bickel believes that judicial review is a "deviant
institution in the American democracy" because overruling a legislative decision
thwarts the will of those who elected the decision makers. Id. at 16-18.
78. See Anders, supra note 7, at 898.
79. See Scalia, supra note 68, at 863 ("[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation
of the Constitution ... is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the
law.").
80. See Rehnquist, supra note 72, at 705.
81. Bork, supra note 68, at 146 (stating that the Court can act "as a legal rather
than a political institution only if it is neutral... in the way it derives and defines the
principles it applies"). Bork's call for decisions made according to neutral principles
is very similar to Professor Herbert Wechsler's theory. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1959) (defining neu-
tral principles as "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved").
82. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
Ind. LJ. 1, 6 (1971).
83. See Bork, supra note 68, at 146-53.
84. Examples of these broadly framed clauses are the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Ninth Amendment. See John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 14-41 (identifying these clauses as being open ended and thus frustrating an
originalist method of constitutional interpretation).
85. See Bork, supra note 68, at 149-50.
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at history to determine what the drafters intended the clauses to
mean.
6
Recognition of the problems presented by open-ended clauses in
the Constitution drives Justice Scalia's substantive due process formu-
lation. Justice Scalia recognizes that the Due Process Clause is open
ended and thus seeks a legitimate means to flesh out the meaning of
the clause!' As demonstrated below, Justice Scalia looks to history to
substantiate the content of the Due Process Clause.88
B. Justice Scalia's Substantive Due Process Formulation
Although Justice Scalia applies his originalist theory to all aspects of
constitutional law, his application has been most controversial in the
area of substantive due process. Justice Scalia has written opinions in
four major substantive due process cases,' and his substantive due
process formulation becomes apparent from these cases. This section
outlines Justice Scalia's substantive due process formulation by glean-
ing the critical elements of his formulation from his opinion in Michael
H. v. Gerald D.,90 Justice Scalia's clearest pronouncement of his sub-
stantive due process formulation. Each element will receive further
support from other substantive due process cases that illustrate the
consistency with which Justice Scalia has maintained his formulation
throughout the years.
1. The Michael H. Case
Michael H. presents the foremost statement of Justice Scalia's sub-
stantive due process formulation. In Michael H., the Court con-
fronted the issue of whether substantive due process provides a
natural father the right to have a relationship with his daughter if she
was born while the mother was married to a different man.
86. See id at 149 (stating that a judge trying to determine the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause should look at what the drafters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, and the ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended the clause to mean).
87. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-22 (1989) (stating that inter-
preting the Due Process Clause has been "treacherous" at times for the Court and
that he is "attempt[ing] to limit and guide interpretation of the [c]lause").
88. Id at 122-27.
89. Three of these four cases will be used to extrapolate Justice Scalia's substan-
tive due process formulation. See infra parts II.B.2.a-e. The other case, Casey, adds
very little to Justice Scalia's views on substantive due process. Much of his dissent is a
bitter attack on the joint opinion, not an outline of his due process formulation. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
90. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). See Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's
Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 Harv. J.L & Pub.
Pol'y 853, 853 (1991) (stating that Justice Scalia "proposed a new test for substantive
due process" in his Michael H. opinion).
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On May 11, 1981, Victoria D. was born to Carole D. The birth cer-
tificate listed her husband, Gerald D., as the father." After the child's
birth, however, Carole informed Gerald that she believed Michael H.,
with whom Carole had an adulterous affair, might be Victoria's bio-
logical father.92 In October 1981, a series of blood tests showed a
98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's biological father.93
Between 1981 and June 1984, Carole and Victoria resided at times
with both Michael and Gerald, but they resided exclusively with Ger-
ald after June 1984. 9 4
Michael filed an action to establish paternity and obtain visitation
rights.95 At the time, however, California law presumed that a child
born to a married woman who lives with her husband is the child of
that woman and her husband.96 This presumption of legitimacy was
rebuttable by blood tests, but only when a motion to compel the blood
tests had been made within the first two years of the child's life. 7
The central issue before the Court was whether the California stat-
ute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Michael claimed that he had a substantive due process right to have a
relationship with his biological daughter and that the state's interest in
protecting Carole and Gerald's marriage was insufficient to warrant
infringement of that right.98 Justice Scalia, in a plurality opinion, held
that the California statute did not violate Michael's substantive due
process rights. 99
2. Justice Scalia's Approach to Substantive Due Process
More important than the result in Michael H. was the substantive
due process formulation Justice Scalia unveiled in the plurality opin-
ion. Throughout the course of the opinion, Justice Scalia displayed
the characteristics of his substantive due process methodology: judi-
cial restraint, reliance on tradition, identification of the proper sources
of tradition, definition of the right in question at the most specific
level, and reliance on precedent.
91. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.
92. Id. at 114.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 114-15.
95. Id. at 114.
96. See Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621 (West 1995) (repealed 1992). In 1989, when
Michael H. was decided, section 621 of the California Evidence Code provided that
"the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115
(quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)).
97. See id. at 118 (quoting Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621 (b)-(d) (West Supp. 1989)).
98. Id. at 121.
99. Id. at 124.
2254 [Vol. 64
HARLAN V. SCALIA
a. The Need for Judicial Restraint
True to originalist form,10 Justice Scalia called for judicial restraint
in deciding whether an asserted right fell within the protection of the
Due Process Clause. Justice Scalia began his opinion by warning
against the temptation for Justices to impose their own values onto the
Constitution."' Justice Scalia stated that "defining the scope of the
Due Process Clause 'has at times been a treacherous field for this
Court,' giving 'reason for concern lest the only limits to... judicial
intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the
time to be Members of this Court.' ,102 He supported this need for
restraint by quoting Justice White in Moore v. City of East Cleveland:
"The Judiciary... is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegiti-
macy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the
Constitution."'103
Justice Scalia called for similar judicial restraint in Burnham v. Su-
perior Court,"° ' in which the Court addressed whether personal ser-
vice of process violated a defendant's due process rights." Justice
Scalia believed that his decision would ensure judicial restraint in per-
sonal jurisdiction cases. Justice Scalia argued that the "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice" standard that Justice
Brennan adopted in his concurrence was improper, 1°6 because it
100. See supra part II.A.
101. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121-22.
102. Id. at 121 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
103. Id. at 121-22 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting)).
104. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
105. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608. In Burnham, a married couple had separated in
New Jersey with an agreement that Mrs. Burnham would file for divorce there on
grounds of irreconcilable differences. Ik at 607. After Mrs. Burnham took their chil-
dren to live in California, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of
desertion. Id. at 608. In response to Mr. Bumham's breach of their agreement, Mrs.
Burnham filed for divorce in California, and while Mr. Burnham was in California on
business and to visit his children, he was served with a California court summons. Id.
at 607-08. Mr. Burnham claimed that because he lacked minimum contacts with Cali-
fornia, requiring him to stand trial in California violated his due process rights. Id.
The California Courts disagreed with Mr. Burnham, holding that personal jurisdiction
was established because Mr. Burnham had been served with process while personally
in California. Id. Justice Scalia, in a plurality opinion, agreed that California could
assert personal jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 619.
106. Justice Brennan believed that the correct inquiry was not whether courts tradi-
tionally could exert personal jurisdiction in these situations, but whether requiring
Mr. Burnham to appear was fair, based on the number of contacts he had with Cali-
fornia. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring). The standard Justice Brennan champi-
oned came from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), where
the Court held that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction does not violate
the Due Process Clause if a defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "Idl at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
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"measure[d] state-court jurisdiction not only against traditional doc-
trines in this country ... but also against each Justice's subjective as-
sessment of what is fair and just."' 7 Implicit in this statement is that
Justice Scalia's method does not allow judges' subjective assessments
to enter into their decisions.
Justice Scalia's call for judicial restraint was particularly strong in
his concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health. °8 In fact, Justice Scalia began and ended his concurrence by
warning the Court against unnecessary judicial intervention. He be-
gan by stressing that he would have preferred not to hear this case
because "the federal courts have no business in this field."' 0 9 At the
end of his concurrence, Justice Scalia again warned the Court against
deciding cases like Cruzan because "[t]his Court need not, and has no
authority to, inject itself into every field of human activity where irra-
tionality and oppression may theoretically occur."110
b. Reliance on Tradition to Decide Whether a Right Merits
Protection by the Due Process Clause
Justice Scalia's substantive due process formulation exhibits a sec-
ond characteristic: the requirement that a right enjoy traditional pro-
tection in American society to receive substantive due process
protection. Justice Scalia stated that for an asserted right to fall within
the protection of the Due Process Clause, it must "be an interest tradi-
tionally protected by our society.""'
Justice Scalia's exclusive reliance on tradition is more stringent than
the Court's analysis in prior substantive due process cases. Previously,
the Court had generally applied a disjunctive test to determine
whether a right was fundamental. To receive protection under the
Due Process Clause, an asserted right had to be (1) "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition, 112 or (2) essential to "the concept
of ordered liberty [such that] neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[the right was] sacrificed."" 3 Justice Scalia's substantive due process
107. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 623.
108. 497 U.S. 261, 292-93 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Cruzan, the parents of
Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in a vegetative state due to an accident, sought a court
order directing the hospital to terminate the life support system that was keeping their
daughter alive. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court of Missouri denied the parents' appli-
cation, and the Court affirmed this denial in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. Id.
109. Id. at 293.
110. Id. at 300-01.
111. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
112. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
113. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). This scheme of requiring a
right to be based either in tradition or central to ordered liberty has been espoused by
both "conservative" and "liberal" Justices. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
191-92 (1986) (White, J.) ("conservative"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)(Blackmun, J.) ("liberal"). Thus, Justice Scalia's reliance on tradition is not new to
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formulation, however, does not follow this disjunctive test. Justice
Scalia's formulation discards protection for an asserted right based on
"the concept of ordered liberty." Instead, the asserted right must
have been traditionally protected by society to receive protection
under the Due Process Clause.114
Once Justice Scalia has established that an asserted right is deeply
ingrained in tradition, his next step is to evaluate how the nation has
historically treated the asserted right. Justice Scalia stated that the
Due Process Clause only protects those rights" 'so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal.' "115 Justice Scalia framed the issue in Michael H. as "whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria
has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices
of our society. ' 116 Justice Scalia concluded that, contrary to Michael's
claims, "our traditions have protected the marital family (Gerald, Car-
ole, and the child they acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort of
claim IMichael asserts." 117
In Bumham,"8 Justice Scalia also relied heavily, if not solely, on
tradition in deciding the appellant's substantive due process claim.
Justice Scalia stated that "[a]mong the most firmly established princi-
ples of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of
a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present
in the State."11 9 Justice Scalia then concluded that the "short of the
matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal
system."'
Similarly, in Cruzan, Justice Scalia based his decision that the hospi-
tal should not cease providing life sustaining treatment solely on tradi-
substantive due process jurisprudence. In fact, there are many substantive due pro-
cess cases that have relied on tradition to decide whether an asserted right receives
due process protection. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (relying on tradition to
deny protection to a homosexual's right of privacy); Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (relying
on tradition to protect "the sanctity of the family"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
220-29 (1972) (relying on tradition to support the right to control the education of
one's child). The novel part of Justice Scalia's opinion is his use of history and tradi-
tion as an independent substantive due process methodology. See Michael H., 491
U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe plurality opinion's exclusively historical
analysis portends a significant and unfortunate departure from our prior cases .... ").
114. See David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 Cardozo L
Rev. 1699, 1705 (1991) (stating that under Justice Scalia's substantive due process
formulation "the rule is that if a government practice is traditional, it is also
constitutional").
115. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
116. Id. at 124.
117. Id.
118. For the facts of Burnham, see supra note 105.
119. Id. at 610.
120. Id. at 619.
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tion. Justice Scalia equated termination of the life-support system to
suicide, and reasoned that because states have traditionally prohibited
suicide, Nancy Cruzan had no right to the termination of her life sup-
port system.' 2 1
c. The Relative Scarcity of Proper Sources of Tradition
The next identifiable aspect of Justice Scalia's substantive due pro-
cess formulation is his identification of the proper sources of tradition
and how he uses these sources. According to Justice Scalia, the cor-
rect traditions to which a judge should look in examining an asserted
due process right are the common law, historical practices, and stat-
utes. 2 Moreover, Justice Scalia has a pattern for the evaluation of
these valid traditional sources. Justice Scalia first analyzes the older
traditions and then examines more recent traditions to determine if
the asserted right has traditionally enjoyed protection. In Michael H.,
Justice Scalia began this analysis by looking at old common law and
concluding that the law traditionally offered no protection to people
in Michael H.'s situation.' 3 Then, Justice Scalia analyzed more mod-
em sources of tradition, including state statutes and recent cases, to
verify his conclusion that an "adulterous father" has no constitutional
right to a relationship with his child.' 4
Justice Scalia also performed a thorough, lengthy analysis of the
proper traditions and history that he consulted in concluding that Cal-
ifornia may exercise personal jurisdiction in Burnham.2 5  As in
Michael H., Justice Scalia commenced his analysis by looking at the
121. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 295-96, 300 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-27 & n.6 (1989). For example,
Justice Scalia states that "[tihe presumption of legitimacy was a fundamental principle
of the common law," id. at 124 (common law); "the evidence shows that ... the ability
of a person in Michael's position to claim paternity has not been generally acknowl-
edged," id. at 125 (historical practices); and "[w]hat counts is whether the States in
fact award substantive parental rights." Id. at 127 (statutes).
123. Id. at 124-25.
124. Id. at 125-30. Justice Scalia's use of "adulterous father" in defining the right in
question is a separate aspect of his substantive due process formulation and will be
discussed separately. See infra part II.B.2.d. Michael H. provided an easy case for
Justice Scalia because both older and more modem sources of tradition pointed to-
wards denying protection to the asserted right. Whether Justice Scalia affords more
deference to the old or modem sources of tradition is still an open question after
Michael H. This question is ostensibly resolved in favor of the old sources of tradition
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). In Casey, Justice Scalia does not examine
the modem statutes that legalize abortion in making his decision that the right to
abortion is not protected by the Due Process Clause. He instead merely states that
"longstanding traditions of American society have permitted [abortion] to be legally
proscribed." Il at 980.
125. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608-16 (1990).
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old common law and then proceeded to analyze more modern sources
of tradition.1
6
d. Highly Specific Definition of Rights
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Justice Scalia's substantive
due process formulation is his method for defining the right in ques-
tion at the most specific level. 127 In Michael H., Justice Scalia defined
the right in question as whether "the natural father of a child con-
ceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to
embrace the child" has any rights to a relationship with that child.128
Justice Scalia, in footnote six of the opinion, 129 explained why he
chose to define the right in question in this manner. He inquired into
"the rights of an adulterous natural father" because judges must "re-
fer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.'1 30 Jus-
tice Scalia defended this specificity as the only means to prevent
judges from making decisions according to their own values. He
stated that because "general traditions provide such imprecise gui-
dance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's
views.' 31 Finally, Justice Scalia indicated that if a tradition lacks
identification at the most specific level, then a judge should "consult,
and (if possible) reason from" the traditions at the next specific level
of generality.
32
126. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. For a thorough analysis of
Justice Scalia's historical analysis of the proper traditions in Burnham, see L Benja-
min Young, Jr., Note, Justice Scalia's History and Tradition: The Chief Nightmare in
Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 Va. L. Rev. 581, 598-602 (1992).
127. This practice, which was specifically defined in footnote six of the Michael H.
opinion, has been the subject of extensive criticism by many commentators. See Lau-
rence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057,1086-87 (1990) (criticizing footnote six for being easily manipu-
lable); id. at 1090-92 (criticizing footnote six for being imprecise and more ambiguous
than Justice Scalia admits); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Con-
stitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55
U. ChL L. Rev. 1161, 1173 (1988) (cautioning that "[t]raditions can be described at
varying levels of generality").
128. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127. By contrast, Justice Brennan defines the right in
question rather broadly, asking whether a parent has a right to a relationship with his
child. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the proper question is "whether
parenthood is an interest that historically has received our attention and protection").
129. See supra note 127.
130. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6.
131. Id. Justice Scalia made these comments in response to Justice Brennan's dis-
sent, which broadly defined the right. See supra note 128. Justice Scalia claims that
Justice Brennan's definition of the right provides no guidelines for the proper level of
generality to define a right. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 ("Why should the relevant
category not even be more general-perhaps 'family relationships'; or 'personal rela-
tionships'; or even 'emotional attachments in general'?").
132. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6. This provision has been especially criticized
by Tribe and Dorf See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1090 (referring to this part of
footnote six as a "pervasive problem" in Justice Scalia's methodology).
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In Cruzan, Justice Scalia also defined the right in question rather
narrowly as the right to commit suicide. 13 3 At least one commentator
has claimed that this is not the most specific level of specificity. 134 The
right to commit suicide, however, is much narrower than the right to
bodily integrity, the right identified by Justice Stevens in dissent.135
e. Reliance on Precedent
Throughout the Michael H. plurality, Justice Scalia attempts to
demonstrate that his reliance on tradition is well grounded in prece-
dent.' 36 For example, he relied on Moore for the proposition that the
Constitution "'protects the sanctity of the family precisely because
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition.' ,,137 Justice Scalia also emphasized that the Court re-
lied heavily on tradition in both Bowers v. Hardwick138 and Roe v.
Wade.139
A similar pattern can be found in Burnham. In Burnham, Justice
Scalia relied heavily on precedent to establish that courts have tradi-
tionally been able to exercise "transient jurisdiction.' 40 Not only did
he cite numerous cases from the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, but he also cited numerous cases from the 1970s and 1980s to
support the proposition that tradition permits courts to exercise tran-
sient jurisdiction. 4'
133. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
134. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Pedigrees of Rights and Powers in Scalia's
Cruzan Concurrence, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 283, 288 (1994) (stating that the most specific
right would have been the right of "patients to refuse artificial hydration and nutrition
through a gastrostomy tube [when] in a persistent vegetative state").
135. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. This point may strike a reader as strange because Justice Scalia is commonly
criticized for lacking respect for precedent in substantive due process. See, e.g., Flem-
ing, supra note 10, at 60 & n.352 (labeling Scalia a "counterrevolutionary conserva-
tive" and then defining that term as a judge that "seek[s] to purge constitutional law
of precedents and principles manifesting liberal error at the earliest available oppor-
tunity"). This point will be discussed and analyzed further. See infra part III.B.3.
137. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
138. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Scalia notes that in Bowers, the Court relied on the na-
tion's tradition of proscribing homosexual sodomy to conclude that there was no right
to such intimate association. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6. In Roe, he points out
that the Court "spent about a fifth of our opinion negating the proposition that there
was a long standing tradition of laws proscribing abortion." Ia
140. Transient, or tag, jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction based on personal service of
process on a defendant within the state where the defendant is being sued. See Steven
R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia's Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Ju-
risdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. Rev. 981, 1002
n.101 (1992). Transient jurisdiction was at issue in Burnham. See supra notes 105-06.
141. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 612-13, 615-16 (1990).
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C. Summary of Justice Scalia's Substantive Due
Process Formulation
Justice Scalia is an originalist who attempts to adapt his originalist
theory to the area of substantive due process. 42 Justice Scalia has
developed a consistent method for evaluating substantive due process
claims. The components of Justice Scalia's substantive due process
formulation include: (1) the need for judicial restraint; (2) the re-
quirement that the right in question enjoy traditional protection; (3)
inspection of common law, statutes, and historical practices in evaluat-
ing the traditional protection of a right; (4) identification of the right
in question at the most specific level of generality; and (5) reliance on
precedent.
Although the above parts have outlined the substantive due process
formulations of Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia, their striking simi-
larity may not be immediately apparent. The next part compares the
substantive due process formulations of Justice Harlan and Justice
Scalia and demonstrates that the two formulations are indeed strik-
ingly similar.
HI. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DUE PROCESS FORMULATIONS
OF JUSTICE SCALIA AND JUSTICE HARLAN
This part compares Justice Harlan's and Justice Scalia's substantive
due process formulations. First, it briefly discusses the readily appar-
ent similarities of their formulations. Both Justice Harlan and Justice
Scalia emphasize judicial restraint, rely on traditions, define the as-
serted right in question at a specific level, and look to the same
sources to identify the proper traditions. Despite these similarities,
Justice Harlan's and Justice Scalia's substantive due process formula-
tions are not usually linked because of perceived differences in their
jurisprudence. This part demonstrates that, upon closer examination,
these apparent differences are either not differences at all or do not
significantly distinguish the two formulations.
A. Some Similarities Between Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia's
Formulations Are Undeniable
Four aspects of Justice Harlan's and Justice Scalia's formulations
are undeniably similar: (1) their belief in judicial restraint; (2) their
reliance on tradition; (3) their beliefs about the proper sources of tra-
dition; and (4) their narrow definition of an asserted right. This sub-
part analyzes each of these similarities.
142. A true originalist does not have a substantive due process formulation at all
because no due process rights are specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See
Bork, supra note 68, at 235-40; see also infra note 165 (discussing how Justice Scalia
has been criticized by Robert Bork for breaking from originalism in Justice Scalia's
Michael H. opinion).
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1. Both Formulations Call For Judicial Restraint in Substantive
Due Process Cases
Both Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia stress the need for judicial
restraint in their substantive due process formulations. Justice Harlan
believed that judges cannot feel "free to roam where unguided specu-
lation might take them," and instead must "exercise limited and
sharply restrained judgment" in analyzing a due process case.143 Simi-
larly, Justice Scalia has stressed the need for judicial restraint, warning
that due process interpretation is "a treacherous field" for the Court
because of the real danger that the decision will be made according to
"the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of
this Court."' 44
2. Both Formulations Rely on Tradition to Determine Whether a
Right Merits Protection Under the Due Process Clause
Both Justices rely on tradition as the basis for evaluating an asserted
right under the Due Process Clause. Both Justice Scalia and Justice
Harlan understand tradition to be embodied in historical practices. 145
Justice Harlan believed that the asserted right in each case involving
the Due Process Clause "must be considered against a background of
Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and
historically developed.' 46 Justice Scalia's beliefs about the need to
rely on tradition echo Justice Harlan's sentiments. Justice Scalia
stated that no substantive due process claim "can be maintained un-
less the claimant demonstrates that the State has deprived him of a
right historically and traditionally protected.' 47
3. Both Formulations Agree on the Proper Sources of Tradition
As demonstrated above, Justice Scalia believes that the proper
sources of tradition are common law, historical practices, and stat-
utes.""' Furthermore, Justice Scalia believes that both old and modern
sources of tradition should be consulted. 49 For example, in Michael
143. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)). Justice Scalia not only stresses judicial restraint
in due process adjudication, but also warns that failure to adhere to this belief may be
the destruction of the Court. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 300-01 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("This Court... has no authority to, inject
itself into every field of human activity where irrationality and oppression may theo-
retically occur, and if it tries to do so it will destroy itself." (emphasis added)).
145. This definition is in contrast to the conception of tradition as aspirational prin-
ciples. See supra note 49.
146. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
147. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at
122 (requiring that a right be "traditionally protected" to merit due process
protection).
148. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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H., Justice Scalia examined both sources of ancient common law and
modem statutes and decisions in evaluating whether the asserted right
merited protection. 5 0
Justice Harlan looked to the same sources in deciding a due process
claim; he is not, however, as explicit as Justice Scalia in doing so. Jus-
tice Scalia tends to state his views on due process briefly and then go
into an elaborate historical analysis; in contrast, Justice Harlan elabo-
rately states his views on due process and then performs a quick, but
binding analysis of the relevant traditions.'-" Although not as analyti-
cally rigorous as Justice Scalia, Justice Harlan also based his decisions
on this analysis of tradition. For example, although most of Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe is spent elaborating his views on due process,
he ultimately found the fact that no state ever had a law criminalizing
the use of contraceptives dispositive. 52
4. Both Formulations Define the Right at Issue in Highly
Specific Terms
Justice Scalia is widely known, if not infamous,'53 for his belief that
rights should be defined at the most specific level.Y He has explicitly
argued that rights must be defined at "the most specific level at which
a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right can be identified."'' 5 Although Justice Harlan never made such
a blanket statement about the proper level of generality, he defined
rights at a very specific level as well. 6 In Poe, Justice Harlan did not
define the asserted right as the right of privacy,15 7 but instead nar-
rowly defined it as the right of a married couple to have privacy in
150. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-27 & n.6.
151. Compare Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121-27 (1989) (devoting one paragraph of the
opinion to general substantive due process beliefs and then devoting four pages of the
opinion to an in-depth historical analysis of the relevant traditions) with Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 540-53, 554-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (writing about due
process for fourteen pages and then devoting only two paragraphs of the dissent to
historical analysis).
152. Poe, 367 U.S. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan demonstrated
the linchpin of his analysis by stating:
[C]onclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment. Although
the Federal Government and many States have at one time or other had on
their books statutes forbidding or regulating the distribution of contracep-
tives, none, so far as I can find, has made the use of contraceptives a crime.
Id. at 554.
153. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1090-93 (blasting Justice Scalia's specific-
ity in defining rights).
154. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
155. Id. at 128 n.6.
156. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
157. Many commentators cite Poe for the proposition that it created the right of
privacy. See e.g., Fried, supra note 20, at 35 (calling Justice Harlan the "author of the
constitutional right to privacy"); Kent Greenawalt, Justice Harlan's Conservatism and
Alternative Possibilities, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 53, 68 (1991) (noting that Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe is a "landmark" in the expansion of fundamental rights).
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their marital relationship.' 5 Justice Harlan also defined the asserted
right in Griswold v. Connecticut in the same narrow manner. 159
B. Exposing the Myth That Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia's
Formulations Have Irreconcilable Differences
The above similarities between Justice Scalia's and Justice Harlan's
substantive due process formulations are not likely to lead to a conclu-
sion that the two formulations are strikingly similar because other as-
pects of Justice Scalia's and Justice Harlan's substantive due process
formulations appear irreconcilable. Examples of these apparent dif-
ferences in the two formulations are: (1) the possibility of evolution;
(2) the restrictive nature of the formulations; (3) the respect each for-
mulation has for precedent; and (4) the rule-like character of each
formulation. This section will argue that deeper examination reveals
that these apparent differences are actually similarities.
1. The Evolutionary Nature of the Formulations
Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation expressly rec-
ognizes the possibility that rights may evolve over time. He stated
that tradition "is a living thing," which suggests that traditions evolve
over the course of time. 60 This evolutionary character seems to mean
that new fundamental rights may be created as time passes.16' Many
commentators criticize Justice Scalia's substantive due process formu-
lation because of its perceived rejection of the possibility for rights to
evolve over time. 16 These commentators would likely claim that this
is one significant difference that would preclude a conclusion that the
two formulations are strikingly similar. A closer examination of Jus-
158. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan's reason for this specific level of definition is because it fits in with the com-
mon law traditions of judicial restraint and slow evolution of principles. See supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
159. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(basing his decision in Griswold on the same grounds he stated in Poe). But see
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the asserted
right in Griswold was not defined at the most specific level of generality).
160. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161. These rights would be known as "unenumerated fundamental rights." These
are rights that are not expressly granted by the Constitution, but are deemed to be
essential to the "liberty" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. See Griswold, 381
U.S. at 492-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring). But see Dworkin, Dominion, supra note 47,
at 129-44 (arguing that all rights are enumerated if the Constitution is regarded as a
scheme of abstract principles).
162. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Scalia's method for turning the Constitution into a "stagnant, archaic, hidebound doc-
ument"); Fleming, Constructing, supra note 47, at 266 (stating that Scalia's due pro-
cess is flawed because it cannot "criticize historical practices"); cf. Young, supra note
70, at 665 ("Originalists... have long rejected the idea that the meaning of the Con-
stitution can evolve in a manner similar to the common law.").
2264 [Vol. 64
HARLAN V. SCALIA
tice Scalia's formulation, however, uncovers a limited concept of
evolution.
Justice Scalia's substantive due process formulation permits the
Constitution to evolve and recognize "unenumerated" fundamental
rights. His article Originalism: The Lesser Evil presents evidence of
the evolutionary possibility inherent in his formulation. 163 Justice
Scalia stated that his process for discovering tradition is very difficult
to apply, and thus in practice, the result will be to "project[] upon the
age of 1789 current, modem values-so that as applied ... original-ism will.., end up as something of a compromise." 1  This acknowl-
edgment shows that Justice Scalia's due process formulation would
permit limited evolution in the law.
Justice Scalia's article is not the only example of evolution in his
substantive due process beliefs. His opinion in Michael H. is evidence
of Justice Scalia's break from strict originalist thought and recognition
that the Constitution can evolve."6 Thus, Justice Scalia's recognition
of substantive due process as a legitimate constitutional doctrine in
the Michael H. opinion shows that Justice Scalia recognizes that rights
may evolve over time because the Due Process Clause has a history of
protecting unenumerated fundamental rights.' 66 Further, in another
case he stated:
Once a law-abiding society has revised its law and practices to com-
ply with such an erroneous decision, the existence of a new 'consen-
sus' can be appealed to-or at least the existence of the pre-existing
consensus to the contrary will no longer be evident-thus enabling
the error to triumph by our very failure promptly to correct it.167
"Revision" and "new consensus" are concepts that imply an evolution
of the law.
163. 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989). This article refers to originalism generally, but
it can be used to demonstrate Scalia's views on due process because they generally
stem from his espousal of originalism. See supra part I.
This article was published in the same year Justice Scalia handed down his Michael
H. opinion. In fact, Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. is, in many ways, an exam-
ple of the evolutionary potential of his due process formulation. See infra note 165.
164. Id at 864. Justice Scalia then proceeded to state that this compromise is
"[p]erhaps not a bad characteristic for a constitutional theory." hi
165. See Bork, supra note 68, at 235-40 (criticizing Justice Scalia for his Michael H.
opinion). Indeed, Robert Bork criticizes Justice Scalia for breaking from originalism
by recognizing the legitimacy of substantive due process. He says that any recognition
of substantive due process is illegitimate because it allows judges to discover rights
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See id. If rights recognized by the
Constitution are not specifically enumerated in the text, then the logical conclusion is
that there is potential for evolution in the Constitution.
166. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing the
"unenumerated" right of nontraditional nuclear families to reside together); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing the "unenumerated" right to marry); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the "unenumerated" right of
privacy).
167. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Justice Scalia recognizes "unenumerated" fundamental
rights. He recognizes that these rights exist, but insists "that the new
'fundamental values' invoked to replace original meaning be clearly
and objectively manifested in the laws of the society."'1 68 Also, by rec-
ognizing the legitimacy of substantive due process in his Michael H.
opinion, Justice Scalia recognized the potential for discovery of
"unenumerated" fundamental rights. 169
Although Justice Scalia's formulation permits some evolution, it re-
mains very limited. For example, he stated that "the content of evolv-
ing concepts is strictly limited by the actual practices of the society, as
reflected in the laws enacted by its legislatures ... [or] at least by
current social practice as reflected in extant legislation."' 70 Also, his
opinion in Michael H., and its stringent requirements for due process
protection,' 7' are evidence that, in practice, Justice Scalia's formula-
tion will not allow for much evolution. Nonetheless, its classification
as "hidebound" and "stagnant"'17 is not fully accurate.
2. The Highly Restrictive Nature of the Formulations
Justice Scalia's substantive due process formulation is definitely re-
strictive. For this reason, Justice Scalia's approach might not appear
comparable to the formulation that Justice Harlan, the author of the
right of privacy, 173 espouses. Many commentators perceive Justice
Harlan, the quintessential conservative judge, as liberal in his inter-
pretation of substantive due process. 74 This perception makes Justice
Harlan's formulation appealing even to some liberal fundamental
rights theorists. 75 A closer inspection, however, reveals Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation as very restrictive.
Four main points discredit the view that Justice Harlan's substantive
due process formulation is liberal or expansive. First, despite the
fleeting liberal language at the beginning of Justice Harlan's dissent in
168. See Scalia, supra note 68, at 863.
169. See Cook, supra note 90, at 861-62; see also supra note 165 (discussing Bork's
criticism of Justice Scalia's substantive due process formulation because it recognizes
"unenumerated" fundamental rights).
170. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1184-85 (1989).
171. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
172. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(referring to the "stagnant" and "hidebound" Constitution that Justice Scalia's due
process formulation provides for).
173. See Fried, supra note 20, at 35.
174. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf
seem to believe that Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation is middle of
the road. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 76-
79 (1991); Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1068-71.
175. See Charles Fried, Order and Law 72 (1991); Tribe & Doff, supra note 174, at
76-79; see also Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 60 (stating that Justice Harlan's
substantive due process formulation is praised by both liberal and conservative funda-
mental rights theorists).
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Poe, the over-arching theme of that dissent is conservative," 6 and thus
his due process formulation is quite limited. Concentrating solely on
the liberal language in Justice Harlan's due process formulation ig-
nores the full thrust of his argument. 1" Preoccupation with the ex-
pansive language would obscure the fact that Justice Harlan severely
limited the scope of his due process protection by grounding it in tra-
dition viewed as historical practices. 78
Similarly, although Justice Harlan believed that the tradition he de-
scribed "is a living thing,"'1 79 its potential for evolution is limited. For
example, Justice Harlan qualified his idea of a living tradition by stat-
ing that "[tihe decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on
... well-accepted principles and criteria."' 80 Justice Harlan further
qualified his living tradition in his assertion that "[a] decision of this
Court which radically departs from [tradition] could not long sur-
vive.'' Thus, Justice Harlan intended his living tradition to evolve in
accordance with the slow, incremental growth that defines the com-
mon law approach182
Under Justice Harlan's formulation, the tradition that "a novel
claim" must build on, and not depart from, is protection of the "pri-
vate realm of family life."'83 Any asserted right that diverged from
this "private realm" of the family would be a break from tradition and
Justice Harlan would not protect that right. Justice Harlan's substan-
tive due process formulation would therefore have been unlikely to
protect the asserted rights in some of the major "autonomy" cases that
176. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
177. For a prime example of this error, see West, supra note 22, at 442-44. Profes-
sor West, in discussing liberty, praises the "liberal concept of ordered liberty so elo-
quently spelled out by Justice Harlan" in his substantive due process formulation. Id.
at 444. West, however, only quotes from the liberal language Justice Harlan includes
in his dissent in Poe. Id. at 443. West ignores the import of Justice Harlan's dissent:
that, despite the abstract nature of the Due Process Clause, the only rights that merit
due process protection are those rights that have been historically protected in our
society. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This is a
crucial mistake. Although many liberals might want to separate the liberal parts of
Harlan's formulations from the restrictive parts, this bifurcation does not portray his
real views. See supra part LB.
178. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
179. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 544.
181. Id. at 542.
182. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
183. Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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followed Griswold,"8 such as Roe v. Wade,185 Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,1 6 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"87 and Bowers v.
Hardwick. 88
Justice Harlan would not have protected the right to abortion in
Roe or Casey because he would not likely have viewed the right to
abortion as building on the tradition of protecting the private realm of
the family.'89 Justice Harlan would also be unlikely to accept the pro-
hibition of abortion as a tradition that the United States had
abandoned. 190
Justice Harlan would also have been skeptical of the extension of
due process protection to the plaintiffs in Moore. 9' Although Justice
Harlan protected "family life," he probably meant traditional, nuclear
family life, and thus would not have extended due process protection
in Moore.192
184. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 525-31 (1989). Sandel draws a distinction be-
tween "old privacy" and "new privacy." Old privacy is the right to keep "intimate
affairs from public view," id at 526, and new privacy is the right to "make certain
sorts of choices, free of interference by the state." Id. at 528. Sandel argues that Jus-
tice Harlan based his dissent in Poe "on grounds that distinguish the old privacy from
the new." Id at 526. Justice Harlan did not object to the Connecticut law banning
contraceptives because he believed that married couples should be free to make their
own decisions. Instead, Justice Harlan objected to the "obnoxiously intrusive means"
Connecticut had chosen to effectuate their law. Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Harlan was not on the Court when it made
its first "new" privacy decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), so nobody
knows for sure how Justice Harlan would have voted in these cases. Arguably, how-
ever, Justice Harlan would only secure basic liberties asserted in the "old" privacy
cases.
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to choose whether to
terminate her pregnancy).
186. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the holding of Roe).
187. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that members of nontraditional nuclear families
have a fundamental right to live together).
188. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend due process protection to
homosexuals).
189. See Fried, supra note 20, at 52 n.121 (expressing "little doubt that [Harlan]
would have held with the dissenters in Roe").
190. Numerous states still had laws prohibiting abortion in 1972. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 118 n.2 (1973).
191. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In Moore, East Cleveland
had passed an ordinance that allowed only members of the same family to reside in an
occupancy together. The ordinance permitted grandparents to live with their
grandchildren if the grandchildren were siblings. A grandmother who shared her
home with two grandsons, who were cousins rather than brothers, was convicted for
violating the ordinance. She appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court. Id. at
495-98.
192. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 25 ("[I]t seems a big step for [Justice Harlan]
to move from conventional marriage ... to other forms of intimate relationship.");
Tribe & Dorf, supra note 174, at 78. But see Ackerman, supra note 15, at 23 (noting
the possibility that Justice Harlan would have extended due process protection past
the "limited scope" of Poe).
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Furthermore, Justice Harlan wrote that "laws forbidding... homo-
sexual practices... form a pattern so deeply pressed into the sub-
stance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area
[of due process] must build upon that basis." 193 This statement dem-
onstrates that Justice Harlan's "living" tradition is not alive enough to
encompass the right asserted in Bowers."9
Another reason that a liberal interpretation of Justice Harlan's sub-
stantive due process formulation is incorrect is that Justice Harlan dis-
sented in every major case that protected personal liberties through
equal protection while he was on the Court.195 Justice Harlan rejected
the results as well as the reasoning in these cases.196 This voting rec-
ord proves that not only was Justice Harlan against protecting the ba-
sic liberties in those cases through equal protection, he was also
against protecting those rights through due process. Thus, Justice
Harlan's vision of due process would not extend to protect the right to
a vote of equal weight' 19 or the right to unrestricted travel throughout
the nation.198 Also, Justice Harlan's due process would not extend to
protect welfare rights, because he concurred, rather than dissented on
due process grounds, in Dandridge v. Williams.'99
193. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
194. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 23 (stating that Justice Harlan was "prepared
to guarantee privacy only to conventional folk who satisfy the politically dominant
view of an acceptable intimate partner"); Fried, supra note 20, at 52 n.121 (stating that
Justice Harlan would not condemn laws proscribing "homosexuality").
195. This Note will discuss Justice Harlan's views on equal protection in detail later.
Justice Harlan wrote opinions in five cases where the Court based its decision on the
grounds that there either was or was not a fundamental right asserted based on the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Harlan dissented in every one of these cases that
granted a fundamental right under equal protection and concurred in the one case
that denied a fundamental right under equal protection. See infra note 211 and ac-
companying text.
196. This is in contrast to Justice Harlan's approach in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
197. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
198. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan may have believed that the right to travel was one of the basic liberties.
In his dissent in Shapiro, Justice Harlan proclaimed that "the right to travel interstate
is a 'fundamental' right ... having its source in the Due Process Clause." Id at 671.
Justice Harlan, however, concluded that the one-year residency requirement at issue
in Shapiro did not impermissibly infringe upon this "fundamental" right. Id. at 677.
Although Justice Harlan claimed that the right to travel is a fundamental right, he
clearly did not apply strict scrutiny to the residency requirements. Justice Harlan em-
ployed a two-step analysis to conclude that the residency requirements were constitu-
tional. First, he identified four "legitimate" government interests for the
requirements. Id. at 672-74. Then Justice Harlan determined that because the re-
quirements only infringed the right to travel incidentally, the governmental interests
outweighed the burden on interstate traveL Id at 676-77. Thus, Justice Harlan's con-
ception of due process did not protect the right to travel throughout the nation.
199. 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (denying due process protec-
tion for a right to minimum welfare entitlements).
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In sum, Justice Harlan's substantive due process beliefs are neither
liberal nor even moderate. Instead, Justice Harlan's approach is re-
strictive; in fact, it is comparable to the restrictiveness of Justice
Scalia's "hidebound" substantive due process. Justice Harlan did
make some liberal statements, but then reined in those statements by
grounding his due process formulation in tradition conceived as his-
torical practices.2 °° Justice Harlan's concept of evolution is also very
limited because he intended the evolution to proceed in a slow, plod-
ding, common law way. Thus, despite all of Justice Harlan's language
about breaking from tradition and rational continuums, 20 1 when
closely scrutinized, his model of substantive due process does not pro-
tect many rights at all.2° Justice Harlan's scope of due process may
very well be limited to protecting the traditional, nuclear family.2 °3
3. The Respect Both Formulations Have for Precedent
Respect for precedent is one aspect of Justice Harlan's and Justice
Scalia's substantive due process formulations that may appear to be
utterly irreconcilable. Commentators regard Justice Harlan, the epit-
ome of the common law jurist, as tremendously respectful of prece-
dent.20 4 Another common perception is that Justice Scalia has little or
no respect for precedent. 20 5 This dichotomy would seemingly make a
difference in the application of the Justices' due process formulations.
The elimination of certain misperceptions, however, uncovers certain
common threads in their views on precedent. Thus, the Justices would
apply their substantive due process formulations in the same general
manner.
a. Respect for "Traditional" Precedents
The first misperception is that Justice Harlan was respectful of pre-
cedent per se; he was not. Actually, Justice Harlan was respectful only
200. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
201. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
202. See supra notes 182-202 and accompanying text; see also Ackerman, supra
note 15, at 23 (concluding that "the libertarian growth potential of [Harlan's dissent
in] Poe seems modest").
203. See id. at 25 ("Given Harlan's particularizing style, it seems a big step for him
to move from conventional marriage, hallowed by time immemorial, to other forms of
intimate relationship.").
204. See, e.g., id. at 7, 9 (characterizing Justice Harlan as a common law jurist and
stating that a common law jurist relies primarily on precedent in deciding a case);
Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 60 & n.352 (labeling Justice Harlan a "preserva-
tive conservative" and defining preservative conservatives as judges who "mostly at-
tempt to preserve precedents").
205. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurispru-
dence. 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1685, 1685 (1991) ("More openly than any other Justice
sitting today, Antonin Scalia is ready to reverse prior Supreme Court precedent.");
Strauss, supra note 114, at 1699 ("We knew from the start that Justice Scalia was not a
great fan of stare decisis.").
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of those precedents that were part of what he held to be tradition
("traditional precedents"). Professor David Strauss sums this point
up by saying, "Precedent overlaps tradition; it is not subsumed by it.
Some precedents may form a part of tradition. But not all do. Some
are s'_mply the decisions of a group of judges rendered a few years
ago." This dichotomy explains many of Justice Harlan's decisions.
He would overturn precedent if he believed it was outside the scope
of tradition. For example, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 7 Jus-
tice Harlan overruled a maritime decision that was eighty-four years
old. 08 He based his decision to overturn the case because the "com-
mon-law rule indicates that it was based on a particular set of factors
that had... never existed in this country at all."' Justice Harlan's
language in Poe also reflects this view. He wrote about the "tradi-
tions," rather than the precedents, that society has abandoned.21 0
A prime example of Justice Harlan's reverence for tradition rather
than precedent is his view of equal protection. During his time on the
Court, Justice Harlan dissented in every major equal protection case
concerning fundamental rights decided by the Court.21' Justice
Harlan dissented in these equal protection cases because protection of
basic liberties in this way was a "radical departure" from the tradi-
tional use of the Equal Protection Clause.2 ' 2 In Harper v. Virginia
206. Strauss, supra note 114, at 1706.
207. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
208. Id. at 409.
209. Id. at 381.
210. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating
that due process analysis should take into account "the traditions from which [the
country] broke").
211. The rights Harlan rejected under equal protection analyses are striking. In
Reynolds v. Sims and Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court, relying
on equal protection, held that a fundamental right to a vote of equal weight exists.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). Harlan dissented in both of these cases, refusing to recog-
nize a fundamental right to vote. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Harper, 383 U.S. at 681 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Reynolds, Harlan would not
have established a fundamental right to vote because "the Equal Protection Clause
was never intended to inhibit the States in choosing any democratic method they
pleased for the apportionment of their legislatures." 377 U.S. at 590-91 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court relied on equal protection to recognize a funda-
mental right to travel, and again Harlan dissented. 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Harlan wrote that "I know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick
out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and ive them
added protection under an unusually stringent equal protection test." Id. at 662. Also,
Harlan concurred in Dandridge v. Williams, which rejected a fundamental right to
welfare benefits under equal protection. 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
212. Before these cases, the Court had traditionally used equal protection to pro-
tect "suspect classifications." A suspect classification refers to laws that discriminate
against a class of people that have been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
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Board of Elections,213 Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's deci-
sion because "in holding the Virginia poll tax violative of the Equal
Protection Clause the Court has departed from long-established stan-
dards governing the application of that clause. '2 14 Similarly, in Sha-
piro v. Thompson,215 Justice Harlan accused the majority of
"appl[ying] an equal protection doctrine of relatively recent vintage,"
and dissented.2 16 The Court did not overturn any precedents in these
cases; it simply departed from traditions. Justice Harlan, however, re-
vered tradition over precedent.
Justice Scalia takes a similar view. If Justice Scalia thinks that a
precedent is part of tradition, he will respect it and build upon that
tradition.217 His opinion in Michael H. demonstrates this approach.
Justice Scalia cites precedents that demonstrate a tradition supporting
the substantive due process formulation he proposes. 218  Justice
Scalia's Burnham opinion similarly relies upon precedents that are
part of a tradition. Justice Scalia goes to great lengths to establish that
transient jurisdiction is part of a longstanding tradition by relying on
numerous precedents that established that rule.219 Precedent is thus a
means to an end rather than an end in itself.
This view of Justice Scalia is not surprising in light of the fact that,
in the substantive due process area, Justice Scalia only calls for the
overturning of one precedent, Roe v. Wade.2 0 Justice Scalia has ac-
cepted every other major substantive due process case as rightly de-
cided. For example, in his opinion in Michael H., he relied on Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland.22' He also indicated that his substantive due
process formulation would have upheld the decisions in Griswold v.
political processes." See Murphy et al., supra note 2, at 971-72 (quoting San Antonio
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). By 1960, the only suspect classifications were
race, see Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and national origin. See Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
213. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
214. IL at 681 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra note 212.
215. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
216. Id. at 658 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217. See Strauss, supra note 114, at 1708 (asserting that, in principle, one could view
Justice Scalia as a traditionalist).
218. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27 & n.6 (1989) (citing cases
such as Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) to support his substantive due pro-
cess formulation). This is not to say that Justice Scalia selects which precedents are
tradition and which precedents are not by any coherent method. See Strauss, supra
note 114, at 1708-10 (criticizing Justice Scalia for not being consistent with his "tradi-
tionalism"); Zipursky, supra note 134, at 315-16 (accusing Justice Scalia of pre-decid-
ing cases according to his a priori political reasoning).
219. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-16 (1990) (citing 43 cases
that supported his holding that transient jurisdiction is part of our nation's tradition).
220. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
221. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121-24.
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Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird.' Lastly, Justice Scalia voted
with the majority of Michael H. and Cruzan.223
b. Justice Harlan the Counterrevolutionary Conservative
Another misperception is that Justice Scalia is a "counterrevolu-
tionary conservative" while Justice Harlan is a "preservative conserva-
tive." 4 A preservative conservative attempts to preserve precedents
even if she would have decided the precedent differently if she had
been sitting on the Court when the case was originally decided 5 A
counterrevolutionary conservative seeks "to purge constitutional law
of precedents and principles manifesting liberal error at the earliest
available opportunity or ... to reinterpret decisions so as to extirpate
any generative force from them." 6 Justice Scalia is a counterrevolu-
tionary conservative; he tries to eliminate or limit almost all of the
liberal decisions of the Warren Court. 7
Justice Harlan can also be seen as a counterrevolutionary conserva-
tive. When Justice Harlan was appointed to the Court he was faced
with the disintegration of the common law method because of the
"constitutional revolution of 1937."1 Instead of adhering to the
precedents of the New Deal Justices, he sought to revitalize "common
law constitutionalism." 229 In fact, contemporary commentators criti-
cized him for ignoring these precedents; they thought he was "ignor-
ing the verdict of history."' 2 0
Another example of Justice Harlan as a counterrevolutionary con-
servative is his dissent in Poe. What Justice Harlan did in 1961 was
revive the concept of liberty in constitutional law.231 Substantive due
process had been dead since the Court overruled Lochner v. New
222. L at 128 n.6.
223. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion); Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
224. See Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 60.
225. l at 60 n.352. Justice O'Connor is an example of a preservative conservative.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) (using respect for
precedent as a reason for not overruling Roe); see also Anders, supra note 7, at 925-26
(characterizing Justice O'Connor as a "preservative conservative").
226. Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 60 n.352.
227. See id at 60 (identifying Justice Scalia as a "counterrevolutionary conserva-
tive"); Strauss, supra note 114, at 1714-15 (stating that the "target" of Justice Scalia's
counterrevolution is the Warren Court).
228. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 7. The "revolution of 1937" refers to the
revolutionary policies of the New Deal Court. See supra notes 39-40 and accompany-
ing text.
229. Ackerman, supra note 15, at 7.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 21. This is not meant to imply that Justice Harlan brought back a
liberal or expansive version of liberty in 1961. In fact, his concept of liberty was very
narrow and restrictive. See supra part M.B.2.
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York Z2 in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish in 1937.233 Lochner is one of
the most infamous cases in constitutional law. 34 In Lochner, the
Court, under a due process analysis, invalidated a state maximum
hours law for bakers because it violated the right of liberty to con-
tract.2 35 In West Coast Hotel, the Court effectively held that the era of
discovering substantive rights in the word "liberty" in the Due Process
Clause was over.z 6 Thus, when Justice Harlan wrote his dissent in
Poe he was calling for the overruling of twenty-four years of precedent
that had denied substantive due process claims. Even more radically,
he was bringing back Lochner. 7
c. Summary
Although Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia may appear diametri-
cally opposed in their beliefs about respect for precedent, a closer ex-
amination discloses common ground in their approaches. First,
neither Justice respects precedent per se, but both respect precedent
that fits within their vision of tradition. Also, both are counterrevolu-
tionary to a certain extent. Their substantive due process formula-
tions owe more to these similarities than to any distinctions in their
views of precedent.
4. The Standard-Like Nature of the Formulations
In her article, The Justices of Rules and Standards,138 Professor
Kathleen Sullivan distinguishes between Justices who make decisions
according to rules and Justices who make decisions according to stan-
dards. To Sullivan, rules "bind[ ] a decision-maker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. '2 39
Once a rule is proclaimed, then it serves as a bright line for all else to
232. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
233. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 47, at 212 ("West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish officially repudiated the Lochner era, marking the first death of
substantive due process." (footnote omitted)).
234. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 47, at 211 n.1.
235. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. Lochner is now regarded as a deplorable decision and
has been the thorn in many fundamental rights theorists' side. See Fleming, Construct-
ing, supra note 47, at 211-12. Every time a liberal judge or fundamental rights theorist
argues for protecting a right not enumerated in the Constitution, they face accusations
of "Lochnering." This phrase was coined by John Hart Ely in response to the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.. 920, 943-44 (1973).
236. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
237. This is not saying that Justice Harlan was bringing back Lochner in the literal
sense; he was not arguing for the liberty of contract. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at
20-21 (noting that Justice Harlan actually took an anti-Lochner stance in this respect).
What he was doing was bringing back the spirit of Lochner, giving meaning to the
word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause.
238. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 24 (1992).
239. ld. at 58.
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follow.2 Standards, on the other hand, "collapse decisionmaking
back into the direct application of the background principle or policy
to a fact situation."'2"l Standards allow the decision maker more flexi-
bility by permitting the decision maker to take the totality of circum-
stances in a fact pattern into account.2 2  According to these
definitions, Justice Scalia might appear to be a Justice of rules and
Justice Harlan a Justice of standards.
Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation is an applica-
tion of standards. Justice Harlan's formulation seeks the necessary
"balance" between liberty and organized society.1 3 He believed that
"Due Process has not been reduced to any formula."244 These state-
ments definitely suggest the flexibility of a standard-like legal direc-
tive. Professor Sullivan herself calls Justice Harlan standard
oriented.2 45
Justice Scalia's overall jurisprudence, on the other hand, is rule-like.
Indeed, Justice Scalia has expressly professed to adhere to rule-like
jurisprudence.246 Professor Sullivan points to the cases Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council247 and R.A. V. v. City of St. PauP48 to show
that Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is rule-like. In Lucas, the Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that any total economic dep-
rivation in the value of an individual's land caused by a state regula-
tion violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 49 In
R-A.V., the Court, again per Justice Scalia, held that the First Amend-
ment guaranteed content neutrality.5 0 Both of these holdings suggest
bright-line rules.
Professor Sullivan also asserts that Justice Scalia's Michael H. opin-
ion is rule-like. This, however, is not accurate. Indeed, despite Justice
Scalia's intention to create a bright-line rule in the substantive due
process area, his formulation is actually quite standard-like. Justice
Scalia states two apparently categorical rules in his Michael H. opin-
ion: (1) no right merits due process protection unless it is a right tradi-
tionally protected by our society, and (2) these rights should be
defined at the most specific level zl l As Professors Tribe and Dorf
correctly point out, however, Justice Scalia's substantive due process
formulation is not nearly as clear-cut as these statements make it
240. Id. at 62.
241. Id. at 58.
242. Id. at 59.
243. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
244. Id.
245. See Sullivan, supra note 238, at 79.
246. See Scalia, supra note 170, at 1178.
247. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
248. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
249. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
250. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
251. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122, 127 n.6 (1989).
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seem. 2 2 Two reasons support this conclusion. First, because no gui-
dance exists in selecting the proper social tradition, judges must make
value judgments in making this selection. 53 Justice Brennan criticized
Justice Scalia for the same reason, stating that "reasonable people can
disagree about the content of particular traditions. ' 254 Such value
judgments are standard-like, not rule-like.
The second criticism of Justice Scalia's apparently rule-like formula-
tion is that no rules govern the selection of the appropriate level of
specificity.25 5 Two problems complicate this analysis. First, no objec-
tive yardstick exists to measure the most specific level of generality.256
The other problem is that Justice Scalia states that in the absence of
an identifiable tradition either protecting or denying protection to a
certain right at the most specific level, a judge must identify and ana-
lyze the next most specific level.257 This is problematic because, as
with identifying the most specific level, the process necessarily in-
volves value judgments.25S
Thus, although Justice Scalia may profess to be a rule-like judge in
principle,5 9 his substantive due process formulation is actually stan-
dard-like because it allows for judicial discretion and does not provide
truly bright-line rules. In this sense, Justice Scalia follows standards
comparable to those that Justice Harlan's due process formulation sets
forth. Judges under Justice Harlan's formulation must determine
which traditions the United States has built upon and which ones it
has abandoned. 60 Judges under Justice Scalia's formulation must
make similar value judgments about which traditions are persuasive
and also must determine the most specific level of right definition.26'
The only difference is that Justice Harlan's formulation explicitly
states that judges are to make value judgments, while Justice Scalia's
formulation leaves judges no choice but to do so in practice.
252. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1085-98.
253. Id. at 1086.
254. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255. See Tribe & Doff, supra note 127, at 1090-92.
256. Al. at 1090 (stating that asking how to define the most specific level of general-
ity is like asking " 'whether a particular line is longer than a rock is heavy' " (quoting
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwest Enter., 468 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring))).
257. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n.6.
258. See Tribe & Doff, supra note 127, at 1090-92; see also Tmothy L. Raschke
Shattuck, Note, Justice Scalia's Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific Tradi-
tions, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2743, 2770-71 (1992) (stating that judicial discretion becomes
involved when judges are forced to identify the next specific level of generality).
259. See supra note 246.
260. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
261. See supra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
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C. Summary
The substantive due process formulations of Justice Harlan and Jus-
tice Scalia are strikingly similar. Both formulations call for judicial
restraint, rely on tradition to evaluate the legitimacy of a claim, define
rights narrowly, and look to positive laws to identify traditions. Sur-
prisingly, both formulations allow for the evolution of rights, but both
are restrictive formulations that will not allow rights to evolve much.
Also, both formulations accord roughly the same amount of respect to
precedent, and both formulations are standard-like, requiring judges
to exercise some discretion in decision making. Thus, despite the dif-
fering jurisprudences of Justice Scalia and Justice Harlan, in the area
of substantive due process their formulations are strikingly similar.
IV. THEF PUZZLING, DANGEROUS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTICE
HARLAN's SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FORMULATION
By LIBERALS
As mentioned above, 62 Planned Parenthood v. Casey is perhaps the
most significant substantive due process case decided by the Rehn-
quist Court. 63 The joint opinion adopted Justice Harlan's substantive
due process formulation,' thus making Justice Harlan's formulation
the model to guide future substantive due process claims. Part III of
this Note established that Justice Harlan's substantive due process for-
mulation has striking similarities to Justice Scalia's formulation. 2-
Many liberal commentators correctly realize that Justice Scalia's for-
mulation would seriously curtail the rights protected under the Due
Process Clause' 6  An observer would therefore expect liberal com-
mentators to criticize the joint opinion for adopting a similarly limit-
ing substantive due process formulation. This, however, is not the
case. Many liberal commentators have instead accepted Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation and actually applauded
the joint opinion for adopting it?67
262. See supra notes 1-6.
263. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 29 ("[Casey] may prove to be one of the most
important Court decisions of this generation.").
264. Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992).
265. See supra part Im.
266. See, e.g., Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 58-59 (comparing Scalia's for-
mulation to the legendary Scylla); Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1098 (stating that
adoption of Justice Scalia's Michael H. formulation would be "frightening"); Zipur-
sky, supra note 134, at 321 (stating that Justice Scalia's substantive due process formu-
lation rejects even a narrow conception of a "living Constitution").
267. See e.g., Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1068-71 (approving of Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation); West, supra note 22, at 442-44 (same);
Dworkln, supra note 6, at 29 & n.7 (accepting the joint opinion's adoption of Justice
Harlan's formulation). But se4 e.g., Fleming, supra note 10, at 59-63 (criticizing Jus-
tice Harlan's substantive due process formulation).
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This part explains why many liberals have accepted Justice Harlan's
substantive due process formulation and why these reasons are unsat-
isfactory. This part then proceeds to demonstrate the implications of
the Casey joint opinion's adoption of Justice Harlan's formulation.
A. Reasons Why Liberals Have Accepted Justice Harlan's
Substantive Due Process Formulation
Four possible reasons may explain why liberals have generally ac-
cepted Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation and the
joint opinion's adoption of it in Casey: (1) they believe that Justice
Harlan's formulation is liberal; (2) they believe that Justice Harlan's
formulation is an acceptable middle-of-the-road approach; (3) they
will accept any formulation that does not overrule substantive due
process precedents; or (4) they believe that the Due Process Clause is
an insufficient source of protection for individual liberties and are
therefore apathetic towards Justice Harlan's formulation.
1. The Myth That Justice Harlan's Approach is Liberal
Some commentators believe that Justice Harlan's substantive due
process formulation is liberal, and accept his formulation on that
ground. For example, Professor Robin West states that Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation is a "generally liberal
concept.' '2 68 Professor Nadine Strossen, the former President of the
American Civil Liberties Union, shares similar sentiments. Although
acknowledging that Justice Harlan was a conservative, she character-
izes Justice Harlan's formulation in this area as quite liberal.269 She
believes that "Justice Harlan was willing to give broad scope to the
Constitution's protection of individual liberties. '270
Such beliefs are unfounded. As demonstrated above, although his
formulation is couched in liberal terms, Justice Harlan's substantive
due process formulation is actually quite restrictive.27'
2. The Myth That Justice Harlan's Approach is Middle of
the Road
Other commentators believe that although Justice Harlan's substan-
tive due process formulation is not liberal, it represents a safe harbor
268. West, supra note 22, at 444. Professor West, however, was not praising Justice
Harlan's formulation for its liberalness. To West, although Justice Harlan's formula-
tion is liberal, Justice Harlan's formulation, and all "the liberty-expanding cases of the
Warren Court era [are] unduly cramped and ungenerous." Id. Thus, Professor West
accepts Justice Harlan's formulation as liberal, but then argues that it is still not lib-
eral enough. This Note agrees that Justice Harlan's formulation is not sufficiently
liberal, but is not willing to accept it as anything short of narrowly conservative.
269. See Strossen, supra note 21, at 134, 143-44.
270. 1& at 144.
271. See supra part III.B.2.
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from the formulation of Justice Scalia. The most prominent of these
commentators are Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf. Tribe
and Dorf believe that Justice Scalia's formulation is so narrow that it
"would severely curtail the Supreme Court's role in protecting indi-
vidual liberties." 2' On the other hand, they believe that Justice
Harlan "inferred unifying principles at a higher level of abstraction,"
because he perceived rights on a rational continuum3 r Thus, they
find solace in his formulation.
Tribe and Doff's commentary overlooks the fact that Justice Harlan
grounded his substantive due process formulation in tradition embod-
ied by historical practices. 274 Tribe and Doff do not recognize that
although Justice Harlan believed that due process is a "rational con-
tinuum," he also believed that this "continuum" was defined accord-
ing to how the nation's traditions have "historically developed. '' z -s
Also, Justice Harlan did not infer principles at a more general level;
instead, he defined rights in a typically narrow, common law way.z76
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the substantive due
process formulations of Justice Scalia and Justice Harlan are strikingly
similar. Thus, Justice Harlan's formulation is not a safe harbor com-
pared to Justice Scalia's formulation, but indeed poses precisely the
same dangers as Justice Scalia's formulation.
3. The Acceptance of Any Substantive Due Process Approach
That Does Not Openly Advocate Overruling
Liberal Precedent
A disturbing trend appears to have developed among liberal consti-
tutional theorists. They are so fearful that the conservative Court will
overrule many of the liberal Warren Court decisions that they will
accept any conservative theory that does not advocate overruling
these precedents. 277 Thus, Justice Harlan's formulation is very attrac-
tive to them.
This phenomenon may explain the reaction of some commentators
to the joint opinion's decision in Casey. Both Professors Ronald
Dworkin and Kathleen Sullivan expressed approval of the joint opin-
272. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1093; see also Young, supra note 126, at
584-85 (stating that Tribe was concerned that Justice Scalia's formulation would elimi-
nate the right to abortion).
273. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 127, at 1068-69.
274. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
275. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
276. One of the linchpins of the common law method is to derive general principles
from prior cases, but a common law jurist never draws grand, abstract principles from
these precedents. Instead, a common law jurist moves the law forward in a slow,
plodding way. See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 9 (stating that a common law judge is
"concerned with a practice's gradual evolution through long periods of time").
277. Cf. Fleming, Autonomy, supra note 10, at 60 ("[Justice Harlan], the most con-
servative member of the Warren Court, has become the last best hope of liberal theo-
rists ...").
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ion's endorsement of a woman's right to choose whether to terminate
a pregnancy.278 Their approvals, however, focus on the result of the
case rather than the adoption of Justice Harlan's restrictive formula-
tion. Both commentators were relieved that the Court did not over-
rule Roe v. Wade.279 Thus, although the Court adopted Justice
Harlan's restrictive formulation in Casey, liberal commentators ac-
cepted it because the Court could have overruled Roe but did not.
The preservation of liberal precedents is not sufficient. Although
the Court may be conservative, liberal commentators must advocate
for a due process approach committed to the protection of fundamen-
tal rights."0 Furthermore, the joint opinion represents the views of a
trio of Justices who are not hard-line conservatives in the substantive
due process area.281 Thus, the powerful theories of scholars like
Dworkin and Sullivan may have substantial influence on their sub-
stantive due process views.2s
278. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 29 (approving of the joint opinion in Casey "be-
cause it reaffirmed and strengthened the reasoning behind ... Roe v. Wade"); Sulli-
van, supra note 238, at 24-25 (stating that the Court "spectacularly failed to overrule
Roe v. Wade" in Casey).
279. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 29 (stating that Casey "may prove to be one of
the most important Court decisions of this generation, not only because it reaffirmed
... Roe v. Wade ... but because three key justices also reaffirmed a more general view
of the nature of the Constitution which they had been appointed to help destroy");
Sullivan, supra note 6, at A23 (stating that the crucial part of the joint opinion was
that it "ringingly reaffirmed the core of Roe").
280. This statement is not meant to suggest that Professors Dworkin and Sullivan
have completely stopped arguing for the protection of fundamental rights. For exam-
ple, Professor Dworkin wrote a very strong argument for the protection of abortion
and euthanasia in 1994. See Dworkin, Dominion, supra note 47.
Some may argue that liberal commentators are not giving up the fight for protec-
tion of individual liberties. Instead, they would say that these commentators are be-
ing realistic (because the Court is conservative) and learning to play according to
conservative rules. See Young, supra note 126, at 618 (calling for liberals to "identify,
analyze, and adapt the methods used by the Rehnquist Court to their own devices").
Although Young may have a point when he calls for litigators to adapt these methods,
id. at 587-88, academics should not do the same. In fact, one of the three reasons
Young fists in favor of liberals adopting conservative methods is that it will "prepare
the way for the eventual reversal of substantive decisions through the use of the same
methodologies by the next liberal Court." Id. at 618. This shows that Young misun-
derstands what the next liberal Court should do. It should not be constrained to using
conservative methods. Instead, it should take its guidance from liberal theories of
constitutional interpretation, and then implement these liberal theories when a sub-
stantive due process case is before the Court.
281. These three Justices are Justice O'Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice Ken-
nedy. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992) (joint opinion).
282. An example of the possibility for a significant turnaround is Justice Blackmun.
Justice Blackmun was considered a conservative when President Nixon appointed him
to the Court in 1969. As the years progressed, however, he became one of the last
bastions of liberalism on the Rehnquist Court. He is best known for writing the ma-
jority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
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4. Many Commentators Are Apathetic Towards the Due
Process Clause
Another possible explanation for liberal commentators' apparent
acceptance of Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation is
that they believe that the Due Process Clause is an inadequate source
of protection for fundamental rights. Recently, many theorists have
been calling for protection of fundamental rights through the Equal
Protection Clause.23 These commentators believe that due process is
destined to be restrictive of fundamental rights, and thus they have
looked to the Equal Protection Clause for expansive protection of
fundamental rights.?&4 Thus, the Court's issuance of a decision like
Casey would not arouse great concern, but would only deepen their
conviction that the Due Process Clause was "backward looking." This
view argues that due process jurisprudence serves to protect all histor-
ical traditions indiscriminately and is powerless to criticize and rem-
edy regrettable traditions such as persecution of homosexuals.3s5
These commentators should not concede due process to the con-
servatives so easily. First, due process provides more absolute protec-
tion of basic liberties than equal protection. Under the due process
analysis, once a right is identified as fundamental, the government
cannot infringe upon that right unless it has a compelling interest and
the statute in question is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Under an equal protection analysis, courts merely hold that if a state
decides to afford this right to some people, then it must do so for all
people. 6 At bottom, equal protection is merely a nondiscrimination
principle. Thus, even if the Court were willing to protect a right under
the Equal Protection Clause, and not the Due Process Clause, the
right would not receive as much protection as it deserves if it is truly
283. See, e.g., John H. Ely, supra note 84, at 162-64 (arguing that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, not the Due Process Clause, would protect homosexuals' rights); Sun-
stein, supra note 39, at 270-85 (making an equal protection argument for protecting a
woman's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy); Andrew Koppelman,
Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 197, 208-19 (1994) (making an argument for protection of homosexuals
through the Equal Protection Clause); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under the Law, 100 Yale L.J. 1281 (1991) (making an equal protection argu-
ment for protecting women's rights); Sunstein, supra note 127, at 1170-78 (arguing
that due process offers insufficient protection to homosexuals but equal protection
offers adequate protection).
284. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 100-02 (1987); Sunstein, supra
note 127, at 1171, 1174-75.
285. See Sunstein, supra note 127, at 1171; see also Fleming, Constructing, supra
note 47, at 267 (analyzing Sunstein's approach to due process and equal protection).
But see Sunstein, supra note 127, at 1173 (conceding that due process can at times be
aspirational rather than backward-looking).
286. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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fundamental. 87 Also, by promoting equality at the expense of liberty,
these commentators are allowing a necessary baseline to erode.2 8
Without a baseline that defines liberty, the definition of equality is of
little significance. 8 9 People who are "equally" oppressed will not re-
gard the Constitution as a great source of protection. Thus, commen-
tators should be wary about dismissing the relevance of the Due
Process Clause.
B. The Implications of the Joint Opinion's Adoption of Justice
Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation
The word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause is a very important
word for protection of individual freedom in the Constitution. No
other phrase potentially guarantees more protection for rights than
the Due Process Clause. As demonstrated, the Equal Protection
Clause's capacity for protection of rights is limited to a nondiscrimina-
tion principle.2 90 The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is a potentially valid source of protecting
fundamental rights.29' The Court, however, rendered this clause use-
less in the Slaughter-House Cases,29 and it has remained stunted ever
since. 93 The Ninth Amendment is another potentially fruitful source
287. Under due process jurisprudence, any law that infringes on a fundamental
right must meet the "strict scrutiny" test. This means that the government must prove
that: (1) a compelling governmental interest is at stake; (2) the government action in
question is "narrowly tailored" to meet this compelling governmental interest; and (3)
the government could not secure the compelling interest by any less restrictive alter-
native. See Murphy et al., supra note 2, at 892-93. This test is very stringent, thus
fundamental rights are very secure.
288. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 47, at 268; see also Tribe & Dorf, supra
note 127, at 1095 ("It is hard to imagine a defensible approach to the two clauses that
does not take greater account of the inseparability of liberty and equality.").
289. See Fleming, Constructing, supra note 47, at 268. As Professor Fleming states,
these commentators, without a conception of liberty, "cannot satisfactorily answer the
question, 'Equality with respect to what?'" Id.
290. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
291. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads,
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
292. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). In Slaughter-House, a group of butchers in Loui-
siana challenged the legitimacy of a monopoly on the slaughter-house business
awarded by the state legislature. Id. at 57-66. The butchers challenged the monopoly
on privileges or immunities, equal protection, and due process grounds. Id. at 66. The
Court rejected all these Fourteenth Amendment claims. Additionally, the Court lim-
ited the thrust of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect only those rights that
were already guaranteed by the Constitution or implicit in citizens' relationship with
the government. Id. at 78-79. This interpretation made the privileges or Immunities
Clause "a vain and idle enactment." Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
293. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 981, 982 n.1. (1979). Some sentiment exists that the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause is a firmer ground than the Due Process Clause for protecting rights. See
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 925-28 (1986).
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for protection of rights.2 94 This amendment, unfortunately, has never
been seriously utilized in a Court decision; judges and commentators
generally consider it a meaningless provision.295
The Due Process Clause, and its promise of liberty, thus is a very
important source of protection for rights. Commentators and judges
who advocate stringent protection for a wide array of rights must ar-
gue for an expansive vision of due process to achieve their goals.
Casey will have implications on the development of liberty embod-
ied in the Due Process Clause. 96 The joint opinion's adoption of Jus-
tice Harlan's substantive due process formulation in Casey is
potentially very dangerous to an expansive concept of liberty in the
coming decades. The joint opinion relied on a substantive due process
formulation that is strikingly similar to Justice Scalia's highly restric-
tive substantive due process formulation. Thus, the joint opinion's
model for substantive due process is one that will restrict and con-
strain the concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause. The saving
grace is that the joint opinion is not an official statement of the
Court.z9 Consequently, the Court is not bound to adopt Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation and liberal commenta-
tors and judges should argue strenuously to avoid this eventuality.
CONCLUSION
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court's joint opinion
reaffirmed the vitality of substantive due process by relying on Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation. Commentators have
generally perceived this formulation as being liberal or middle of the
road. A closer examination reveals, however, that Justice Harlan's
substantive due process formulation is actually restrictive and con-
servative. In fact, it is strikingly similar to Justice Scalia's "hide-
bound" substantive due process formulation.
294. The Ninth Amendment reads, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. Coast. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment is such a potentially fruitful source of
rights because its words suggest that there are certain rights that had not been specifi-
cally enumerated in the text of the Constitution or the first eight amendments. See
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L Rev.
3, 36-37 (1970); Ely, supra note 84, at 38.
295. See Bork, supra note 68, at 166 (likening the Ninth Amendment to an inkblot
because it is so hopelessly vague that its meaning cannot be deciphered); Ely, supra
note 84, at 34 (stating that the Ninth Amendment is regarded as somewhat of a joke
in "legal circles"). The Ninth Amendment, however, should not be regarded this way.
In fact, the language of the Ninth Amendment is perhaps the best evidence that the
Constitution protects certain "unenumerated" fundamental rights. See supra note 293.
296. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 29.
297. The joint opinion only had three supporters, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter. Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurred in the judgment, but did not join
the joint opinion's reasoning. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 911
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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What drives Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation
similarly drives Justice Scalia's formulation. Both formulations are re-
strictive; they exclusively rely upon tradition in deciding whether a
right merits due process protection, they allow for only a narrow con-
ception of evolution, and both stress the need for judicial restraint.
Moreover, both Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia define rights nar-
rowly and have analogous views about respecting precedent.
Despite the general jurisprudential differences that exist between
Justice Harlan and Justice Scalia, their substantive due process formu-
lations are strikingly similar. Thus, liberal commentators or judges
embracing Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation be-
cause they believe it is either expansive or a safe alternative to Justice
Scalia's restrictive formulation misconstrue the nature of Justice
Harlan's formulation.
Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff once wrote that if Jus-
tice Scalia's substantive due process formulation was ever adopted by
the Supreme Court, the prospects for liberty in this nation would be
"frightening." 298 This Note demonstrates that the adoption of Justice
Harlan's substantive due process formulation offers similarly "fright-
ening" prospects for liberty.
298. Tribe & Doff, supra note 127, at 1098.
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